Access-request receipts
Receipts from the agreement flow, anchored so the terms and timing of each request are tamper-evident.
ÃDO is where the work's provenance lives — content-addressed on IPFS and written to a hash-chained, append-only record. Anyone can verify that a published artifact is exactly the bytes that produced a result. Accountability is not a policy on top; it is the address of the thing.
Content-addressed · Hash-chained · Append-onlyAnchoring is four mechanical steps. There is no trusted authority in the loop — the hash does the work.
Hash
Every artifact — a benchmark package, an evidence release, an access request — is SHA-256 hashed on creation.
Address
The artifact is content-addressed on IPFS, so its address is its hash — change one byte and the address changes.
Chain
The hash is written to an append-only record that links to the prior head, so the order and integrity of the whole history is verifiable.
Verify
Anyone with the artifact can recompute the hash and confirm it matches the published anchor. No trust required.
The frozen package behind a reported number, hashed so the bytes that produced the result are fixed.
results.ado.earth →Public evidence packages with their sealed-source commitments, each carrying a signed manifest digest.
evidence.ado.earth →Receipts from the agreement flow, anchored so the terms and timing of each request are tamper-evident.
The record of what was withheld before publication and why, so the omission itself is auditable.
Each anchored artifact publishes its digest and the head of the chain it links into. The values below are an illustrative example — they are not live anchors.
When the address of a thing is its own hash, tampering is not hidden — it is a different address. That is what makes 'accountable by construction' literal rather than aspirational.